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This case presents a real decision set regarding the future of a family business 
reaching its 6th generation, whose high dispersion of shares and estrangement between 
family branches yielded a risky deadlock for the business growth and survival. Written 
from the family CEO’s perspective, the case depicts his need to attract the passive and 
dissenting wings of shareholders, after running through the whole history of relational 
problems between them. At stake is a nonconsensual diversifying investment opportunity, 
which is key to the survival and growth of the business, yet is dependent on a hardly 
attainable qualified majority voting.  
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WHEN MINORITY HOLDS THE POWER 
The spring of 2015 had showed up with the warmth of the morning sun and a 
gentle breeze in the air, so Leonardo took the opportunity to sit down watching the river 
flow. This daily half-hour walk to the office was the best moment to clear his mind and 
he was in no rush: by then, his son Nicolas, who was already in charge of most of the 
productive and commercial duties, had for sure reached the facilities in the riverside of 
Lisbon. He trusted his firstborn was faster and more competent in his job than himself, 
which combined with the unique conditions of the family farm should offer him plenty 
reasons to be optimistic about the future, and yet, he just could not rest easy on that. 
His main concern was not to manage the business, but rather how to manage his 
own family: with 104 shareholders spread between the 4th and 6th generations, a constantly 
growing number which would soon grow to more than 200, wrangling was increasingly 
threatening continuity. The company urgently needed to find a new governance structure, 
to cope with these challenges and to simultaneously enable the launch of a major expansion. 
Until the night before, Leonardo was determined to convene a general meeting for 
the following month, where the Board would try to push through an amendment of the 
articles of incorporation. However, having read a couple of the latest emails that some 
cousins often sent to the whole family, contesting and spreading the fear about his 
intentions, the CEO had to admit the current chances of such approval were minimal but 
still had no clue what else he could do to convince them. 
“This may well be the last chance for the family to function as such before it 
becomes an unmanageable group of strangers.” – He thought, whilst watching a 
meticulously choreographed crew sailing some vessel in the river – “We cannot put our 
interests ahead of the company, we only have it borrowed from our children and we owe 
them a sustainable future! How can they ignore such responsibility?” 
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Soc. Alexander Rodrigues Ltd. 
Building a legacy, Rodrigues by Rodrigues 
Alexander – It was the spring of 1875, precisely 140 years before, when 
Leonardo’s great grandfather arrived to Quixote, a small village in the remote countryside 
of Portugal, sitting in a horse-drawn chariot. Despite being thought to be deluded for buying 
such inhospitable terrains, Alexander Rodrigues had a visionary belief in the profitability 
of the cork business to the point of investing everything he had in the purchase of the oak 
forests he had heard that existed in that region. More than 2000 deeds later, he had 
gathered a 5500 hectares estate, including smaller plots of vineyard and olive groves. 
Additionally, the entrepreneur created a pioneering industrialized factory of cork stoppers 
on site and made every effort to link the underdeveloped region to Lisbon through railway. 
This latter achievement allowed him to carry the production outputs to the still-in-use 
headquarters in Lisbon, in a 16th century building he had acquired and adapted to an 
administrative and warehouse facility, before exporting them worldwide. Later, in 1902, 
Alexander established the business as the first agricultural private limited company (Ltd.) 
in the country, whose articles of incorporation obliged to keep ownership within his direct 
offspring in order to assure continuity across generations. By the time of his death, he left 
it to his nine living heirs, including his second wife, as shown in Appendix 1. 
Gabriel – The articles also set that the board should have three directors but only 
one fully executive, while others held more advisory roles. Gabriel was the chosen one to 
continue pursuing the founder’s dream, cause for which he devoted more than thirty years, 
taking the effort to streamline, monetize and expand the three productions. Back then, he 
used to move in with his family to the farmhouse for a couple of months during the warm 
season. His half-brother Ignacio, with whom he kept a strong relationship, would often 
come along and grew close to his same age nephew Paul, becoming as inseparable 
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‘brothers’. Meanwhile, as Gabriel aged, the former began to become more and more involved 
in the business, helping him, while the latter preferred to devote himself to a promising 
career as a lawyer in the capital. Therefore, when the time came to find a successor upon his 
death, the choice had consensually fallen over Ignacio, with Paul claiming he would rather 
occupy only one of the consultative Board seats together with a son of his aunt Fatima. 
Ignacio – the founder’s youngest son is now proudly remembered for having a 
selfless heart which, with his roots deeply embedded in Quixote, led him to dedicate most 
of his life and mandate to the local development. Nevertheless, it has not always been like 
this: for a good part of his term, Ignacio faced open contestation from some of his nephews. 
At first, strife appeared when he requested the family’s approval to issue a 
considerable amount of debt to invest on the construction of two dams. The region was 
particularly arid and the brook that crossed the property dried every summer, often leading 
to wipeouts of the wine and olive crops that could otherwise be avoided through water 
retention. Therefore, when the Portuguese government, embedded in the 60’s boom spirit, 
issued a credit line with extremely favorable conditions to promote such investments, 
Ignacio did not want to let the opportunity slip away. Yet, he had a hard time convincing 
some relatives who feared that if something went wrong they could see their personal 
assets pawned, even though this was not legally a possibility in private limited companies. 
Then again, when he started his philanthropic mission, which included the building and 
furnishing of dozens of homes and public facilities for the local community, his family 
complained he could not spend the company’s resources in such way. The administrator 
even had to present invoices proving everything had been paid from his own pocket. 
In light of the repeated criticism, Ignacio quitted general assembles for more than 
once, claiming he could not stand it anymore. In any case, the family always immediately 
and unanimously voted for his continuity. The leader’s incredible aptitude for advocacy 
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of the region was granting a lot of support to the cause, even from the highest spheres of 
society and government, and therefore, by the end of his life, the entire family was proud 
of the reputation built towards their name. Indeed, even nowadays most of the farm 
workers live in houses lent by the company to which they dedicate their whole life. 
Alexander II – In 1972, the third Board taking control of the company was composed 
by three children of the previous administrators, but the economic and social circumstances 
found were quite the contrary. Shortly after their election, Portugal had undergone the 
1974 revolution that placed all agricultural businesses under threat by land reform. The 
family managed to avoid the farm’s expropriation but still suffered serious implications, 
mostly due to the absolute lack of outlet for that year’s production. Moreover, unlike 
hitherto, agriculture companies had to start paying VAT, employee’s social security and 
corporate taxes. With the company under severe financial stress, Alexander requested the 
shareholder assembly for capital injection, but the will of some relatives was far the 
opposite: given all the uncertainties, they would rather liquidate assets and cash in as 
much as possible. Such divergence brought heated debate during the following years, but 
neither sides were able to gather the required 75% of the shares support. Anyhow, the 
firm managed to survive thanks to its entry in the fruit farming business, made possible 
by the implementation of an irrigation system from the dams concluded in the meantime. 
Despite this culture being considerably profitable for a couple decades, after which it was 
replaced for more vineyards, the firm still needed a large expenditure retrenchment. 
Leonardo – The current CEO took the seat, accompanied by two cousins from 
David’s and Fatima’s branches, keen on recovering the firm from the consequences of 
the downturn. Indeed, the strengthened economic confidence in the 90’s, along with 
cork’s prices going out off the roof, allowed the company to significantly invest in a 
needed modernization of processes, machinery and facilities, but not for long. 
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“So, how’s the business?” 
Olive Oil – This was the first culture to be revamped, with the construction of a 
state-of-the-art mill, the product’s premium rebranding and organic certification, and 
constant presence in international fairs and contests. The resulting quality had no match 
in the market and granted plenty awards and publicity.  However, besides the increased 
competition in the premium market pulling down margins since then, the financial impact 
of this culture is residual due to its small acreage (120 hectares). As a result of both 
factors, the firm favors sale to small loyal retailers without intermediaries. 
Wine – Wine-making has gone through the exact same process as olive oil but 
only more recently, because it first involved having the already too aged 26 hectares of 
vineyards gradually replanted over the last 20 years. Wine had been mostly sold in bulk 
to the same company for decades, which granted safe but continuously declining income 
and low margins. Therefore, as replanting massively increased quantity and quality, Leonardo 
hired his son Nicolas - upon family’s approval – to help him gather and lead a new team 
responsible for creating and marketing the organic and biodynamic product under new 
own labels. Once again, the firm’s strategy was paying off but had limited capacity: each 
year a larger portion of the harvest was kept for the own brand, and then exported worldwide. 
Cork – After the 90’s, the traditional cash cow of the company became a mere 
shadow of yesteryear. Droughts and arsons have been decimating the population of oak 
for decades and all the management’s attempts of seeding did not yield any results. As 
shown in the Appendix 2, not only the average harvest decreased 50% in quantity over 
the last 40 years but also market prices have been falling continuously on the whole 
industry recently, causing a dramatic revenue shortfall. Unfortunately, this type of soil, 
that occupies 97% of the estate, is not suitable for any other cultivation. 
Overview – Complementarily, Soc. Alexander Rodrigues owned a store and a 
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renowned restaurant in the Quixote village, which provided residual or no profitability but 
were substantial in terms of publicity and reputation of the brand, family and region. Also, 
the ancient building in Lisbon’s riverside, where the headquarters occupies only a small 
part, used to provide some additional income in rents, but its degradation and the 
prospects of a future investment have been leading to the reduction of these contracts. 
Leonardo, despite the hiring of more qualified professionals, was able to 
significantly cut spendings but the severe shortfall in revenues – check Appendix 3 for 
more details - has been causing consecutive net losses over the last 4 years. Traditionally, 
the firm kept a zero debt policy and some liquidity that served as cushion, but it would 
not last much longer and there was a growing dissatisfaction amongst shareholders. 
Troubles in their own backyard 
A break in the weather 
For two decades after Leonardo’s election, the strife that had chased his two 
predecessors seemed to be gone, and general assemblies, which lasted for no more than a 
few hours, were peaceful conversations in his office between the Board, his siblings, and 
three or four more cousins. The business was going well, allowing for some historically 
rare dividend distribution, and despite the majority of the owners not following the reality 
of the company, he was still hearing some compliments from all over the family, including 
the traditionally disagreeing branch of Gabriel’s descendants. Nonetheless, quietness was 
suddenly shattered again when in 2008 a group of four siblings (5% of shares) from that 
branch, self-titled as “dissenters”, unexpectedly came for the first time to an assembly to 
protest against the Board’s acting. The trigger had been a public warning in the newspapers 
announcing a lien on the company’s property in Lisbon. The firm had been facing a public 
prosecution for a long time and, despite innocence being proven, procedural flaws made 




This group of dissenters then started sending emails and organizing undercover 
discussion meetings in Braga (their hometown, 350km from Lisbon) between some 
specifically chosen shareholders, in particular those less familiar and active in the business. 
In them, intimidated by the possibility of patrimonial losses, they casted doubts about the 
Board’s intentions and capacities to run the company, claiming it was taking advantage 
of the rest of the family. As the fear spread, around 15% of passive owners granted to be 
represented by the dissenters, while others remained supporters of the Board or barely reacted, 
but very few from either side actually sought any clarification directly from the management. 
Thereafter, never were assemblies the same. Despite the increased percentage of 
capital present (Appendix 4), it did not translate into much more attendees, as most of the 
shareholders always preferred to appoint a relative as their proxy holder. The atmosphere, 
however, was now invariably tense, with some heated accusations occasionally erupting 
from the middle of the dissenters’ lengthy dictations of highly technical questions to the 
minutes. These entailed great difficulty and time for the Board to answer, and the replies 
seemed to barely interest even the own arguer. As a result, the few supporters who 
regularly attended lamented there was little room for plain talk and effective enlightenments. 
Leonardo was conscious of the uselessness of all this process for both sides, but 
still did not know how to fix it. Neither was he able to give cousins a proper insight about 
the business, nor could he know their will to its future. And it got even worse regarding 
the younger generations, since, apart from one or two exceptions as his own children, the 
shares were integrally held by the oldest relatives in each branch. 
Although most of the interventions regarded divergences over juridical and 
accounting details, there was more to the matter. For instance, one of the most frequent 
demands was for the right to unrestricted usage of the farmhouse for family vacations. 
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This residence was aimed to host the management in its weekly visits to the farm, and for 
logistical and financial reasons, each shareholder’s usage was limited to three free days 
per year. Since this demand kept recurring, Leonardo invited an ad hoc committee, 
composed by an ancient from each branch, to design a sustainable usage policy. They set a 
daily rate per guest that allowed to drop the time restrictions, and even though few cousins 
ever made use of it in the meantime, it was enough to stop those specific complaints. 
For another thing, from time to time the dissenters shot the breeze about the lack of 
dividends, but turnover was so small compared to the dispersal of shares that the management 
and its supporters preferred to keep the business healthy rather than drain its wealth. It was 
thanks to the consecutive retained earnings that the company had been able to do all the 
revamping processes without debt. In fact, the last time the business had had considerable 
gains, the Board had even opted to offer a supplementary wage to all employees in that year, 
instead of distributing dividends. “They are our most valuable asset! Even the new ones take 
up the cudgels for the company as most cousins would never” – considered Leonardo. 
Now it is personal 
Once the existence of the email chains became of general knowledge, these began 
to be addressed to the whole family. At first, Leonardo did not let them unanswered, 
especially when he felt there was the need to disprove false information, but once the 
conversation began to get more personal and even insulting, he decided to stop responding.  
It was only a couple years later that Leonardo realized the reason of the long 
technical questions dictated to the minutes, when the four dissenters used the latter as 
proof to file a lawsuit against the company, alleging illegal accounting practices and 
requesting the impeachment of all the recent assemblies and the dismissal of the management. 
Even tough courts have dismissed all their claims, it was felt as a treason to the family, 
which, summed with all other aspects, burnt all bridges between both sides of the dispute. 
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Hidden in the closet 
Despite never being openly discussed, Leonardo suspected from asides that some 
problems emerged long ago. One of them was the old rumor amongst some of Fatima’s 
and Gabriel’s descendants claiming the original distribution of Alexander Rodrigues’ 
shares had been inequitable. The problem was that Ignacio’s branch had a bigger 
percentage than any other, and the fact it had fewer descendants even increased their 
imbalance feeling. To illustrate, some cousins had even claimed that the assembly voting 
process should be done by head rather than by percentage of shares. However, the facts 
remain that the original distribution had been done in nine equal parts as required by law, 
but subsequent deaths of Ignacio’s brother and mother eventually left him with 3/9. 
Gabriel also held more because he bought his brother Cesar’s participation, but all the 
other minor variations were exclusively due to later deaths and one-off transactions.  
A further issue was linked to the second succession. The process was peaceful and 
consensual between men, but nonetheless had opened hidden irreparable breaches on the 
feminine side of the family. Actually, back then women did not have a say on the business 
but, in the typical Portuguese matriarchal family, their influence within doors could be 
immense. It goes back to when Gabriel, given his wife did not enjoy the yearly season on 
Quixote, instructed his younger daughter Sarah to be the matron of the farmhouse, a 
leading and prestigious position at the time. Sarah was helped by her single daughter, 
Teresa, who grew nurturing the ambition to succeed her. It happened however that, when 
Ignacio took the lead, he delegated the job to his daughter-in-law Alexandra. This angered 
Teresa, currently 83 years old, whose influence in her branch is said to be the main driver 
for the contestation against the three administrations since then. 
Even though it seemed that nearly all the dissatisfied passive cousins who were 
represented by the dissenters came from this branch, what could Leonardo do if 
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confidence was totally broken and they never even showed up to assemblies? For one 
side, any of his attempts to intervene and clarify had no credibility and had only worsened 
the conflict. On the other hand, how could he accede to the demands of those who had 
never even set foot on the premises? Or rather, to be honest, besides his resignation, after 
all this time he still did not know what the dissenters’ intentions were. 
Setting the stage for the future 
The management had been designing a complete strategy to cope with the problems 
both within the family and the business, which implied to update the centenarian bylaws. 
Soc. Alexander Rodrigues S.A. – The first step was to convert the Private 
Limited Company into an unlisted Public Limited Company (Sociedade Anónima). This 
legal structure had several differences that made it more suitable to the current size of the 
family, whose younger generations did not even know each other. For instance, major 
changes, which were subject to approval by qualified majority voting, demanded only 2/3 
of the shares present in assembly, instead of the current 75% of total equity. The goal was 
to simplify decision-making processes for future generations: if finding consensus (or 
even gather enough owners in assembly) was such an impossible task in those days, how 
would it be in the future? Yet, judging by last night emails, dissenters’ adverse reaction, 
claiming that Ignacio’s branch had the ulterior motive of opening equity to outsiders as 
to reduce others’ shares and power, had awakened most of  passive owners. 
Trading Company – The current articles imposed many limitations to the 
management because it restricted company’s activity to the sale of own-produced 
agricultural products. So, the second step would be the change the type of activity from 
agricultural to commercial, fundamental for the firm to diversify its activities with the 
two projects explained below. The goal was not only to reduce exposure to the cork 
market, but also to seek the so much needed scale advantages connected to turnover. 
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Namely, it would allow to create independent marketing, sales, and finance departments, 
and expand the workforce at all levels, including non-family managers in top-positions. 
Wine – The firm was few steps away from being a renowned player in the industry: 
the producing team had great expertise, the brand had recognized quality, the history and 
seniority of the family represented a big plus in the market, and the internationalization 
campaign that Nicolas was making, besides being supported by communitarian funds, had 
granted an excellent distribution network. Growth was merely limited by the small productive 
capacity and this could only be worked around by purchasing grapes and wine for resale. 
Hotel – With the help of specialist consultancy, the board had developed a five 
star hotel project to harness the idle estate in Lisbon. Tourism outlook was great, which 
combined with the unique conditions offered by the iconic historic building promised 
excellent financial results, not to mention the pride in owning one of the best hotels in 
town. Forecasts for the investment projected an internal rate of return of 10% and a net 
present value equivalent to six times the current annual revenues, and it did not even take 
into account the strong incentives and privileged financing conditions offered by the 
government. With the expected annual EBITDA of 1.4 million euro, the company could 
finally sustain losses in other business areas and probably even start to distribute dividends. 
Leonardo expected such figures would finally please everyone, but it had not been 
welcomed at all by the usual wings. Arguing the family had no experience in tourism, they 
feared it would end up losing everything or, even worse, that they could have to pay it from 
their own pocket - a misunderstanding since it was not legally a possibility in Ltd.’s or S.A.’s. 
On the horns of a dilemma 
Despite the burden in workload and expenses they caused, never dissenters had been 
a real obstacle to decision-making because they represented a minority. But now, for the 
first time, everything depended on them and they seemed determined to hold their cards. 
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Leonardo had already given up on convening the assembly to amend the articles of 
incorporation. Shareholders were not properly informed and prepared, and it was highly 
unlikely the needed 75% of approval were reached. He still believed it was an indispensable 
change but try it then would be too risky. After all, it would already be so hard to persuade all 
passive owners to come to a meeting that there could never be a second chance. But how could 
he raise awareness to the critical situation and motivate to the new business alternatives? 
Should he consider the sale of the building and project to a third party as some 
dissenters preferred? Distributing part of the revenue may reduce their dissatisfaction and the 
remaining could be used to sustain the business a few more years while hoping for an unlikely 
recovery of the cork market. However, neither the management nor the majority of owners 
looked kindly to the loss of the historic building, together with 35% of its value in taxes, or the 
dividend distribution that, besides only giving a residual return per member, would jeopardize 
the company’s future even more. And most of all, cash would serve little purpose without the 
change in by-laws because there was no other opportunities for investment and growth. 
He even had weighted his resignation but, even though an external Board had the 
advantage of being free from the accumulated distrust to seek consensus, it could not 
parachute without any knowledge of the family and the business. Furthermore, the present 
situation was repellent even for a family run, let alone non-family managers, and the business 
dimension did not allow to pay for additional senior positions. Perhaps there could be a 
middle way, where an external consultant mediated a rapprochement between shareholders. 
“Our founder risked everything he had to build this business at the age of 30. 
Nothing ventured, nothing gained, and in this case no comparison between what is lost 
by not trying and what is lost by not fully achieving the objectives.” – Leonardo thought, 
resuming his walk – “None of us had to do absolutely anything to receive this legacy, so 




Appendix 1 – Summarized genogram (selectively itemized) with share distribution by branches 
Branch B C D E F G H I TOTAL 
Shares (%) 8,1 - 4,8 8,9 15,1 25,9 - 37,2 100 
# Shareholders 4 - 15 24 24 29 - 8 104 











































































Appendix 2 – Cork’s quantities and prices 
 @ (arroba) is the traditional cork’s measure: 1@ = 15 kg = 33 lb.                      All prices updated to inflation 
Appendix 3 – Comparison of revenues per culture (2004 vs. 2014) 
Year Cork Wine (bulk) Wine (own label) Olive Oil Rents Others Total 
2004 583 K€ 101 K€ 15 K€ 135 K€ 125 K€ 40 K€ 1000 K€ 
2014 252 K€ 69 K€ 105 K€ 124 K€ 72 K€ 140 K€ 763 K€ 
 
 2004 values updated to inflation                          Includes subsidies, restaurant (closed for renovations in 2004) and extraordinary revenues 
Appendix 4 – Attendance and voting results for approval of annual report
Cork 58%
Wine (bulk) 10%
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(In the Abstract section) 
During the purposed discussion, students are requested to do a critic analysis of 
the factors and multipliers that led to the tension between the shareholders, learn and 
apply the socioemotional wealth concept to characterize the current variety of opinions 
amongst them, and propose a reconciliation strategy based on their findings. 
Target Audience 
This case was developed as a learning tool for Family Business courses of 
undergraduate and master programs in Management, with helpful examples and academic 
support to the learning of a varied collection of the most important concepts in this field, such 
as: the cousin consortium specificities; active vs. inactive and majority vs. minority owners’ 
conflicts; socioemotional wealth; family governance structures (family meetings, council, 
and protocol); and fair process. In order to take full advantage of the discussion, students, 
or at least their instructor, should have basic familiarity with the concepts of stewardship, 
agency theory, genograms, zero-sum dynamics, and the three circles model of system theory. 
Learning Objectives 
This teaching note presents a suggested analysis, discussion, and resolution of the 
case, as well as the needed underlying theory, to allow students to: 
1. Understand the increased complexity and specificities of relational conflicts in 
business families in later stages, and identify their original causes and future consequences. 
2. Be aware of the weight of the different dimensions of socioemotional wealth in 
family owners, and how they can affect differently each one’s criteria. 
3. Know and properly apply the main mechanisms for the prevention and solving 




1 – Problems from the past  
1.1 - What seem to be the most determinant factors to the long lasting hostile 
relationship between shareholders? 
Students should be able to identify, from the “Hidden in the closet” section, the 
share distribution and second succession to power as the original trigger of the dispute. 
By analyzing the extensive list of problems contested, students may perceive that these 
invariably come from the deterred branch (G) towards the one more involved in the 
management of the firm (I). Alienation from power and perceived unfairness are common 
reasons of anger and frustration between family owners that generate hard to solve 
conflicts (Poza 2007, 45), in this case both role conflicts - against management - and 
affective ones - against branch I - (Chandler 2015, 1306). To check for reading and assure 
proper understanding by the whole class, the instructor may conduct, step-by-step on the 
chalkboard, a redrawing of the genogram based on pupil explanation of the events, 
starting with the one presented in Appendix 1 until it matches the one in Appendix 5. 
1.2 – Why do these incidents still affect the family dynamics at present? 
Since the referred succession, the family developed from the sibling generation (6 
siblings) to a complex cousin consortium (more than 100 members), with ownership spread 
over different generations and branches, but none with enough voting shares to control 
decisions – recall Appendix 1 (Gersick et al. 1997, 47). In fact, siblings’ career choices tend 
to influence the cousin presence in management, perpetuating discrepancies and reducing 
general commitment to the company: while one branch becomes dominant, the others 
begin to step back from involvement (Gersick et al. 1997, 50). Therefore, and given that 
share dilution through generations decreased economic interest (Mcclure 2014), most 
shareholders outside the management branch became low involvement supporters or 
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merely passive owners. However, as conflicts were also transmitted through generations 
and polarize branches into camps (Gersick et al. 1997, 50), most descendants from the 
deterred branch kept reacting hostilely. 
1.3 – Regarding the management and dissenters’ behaviors along the way: 
how did they worsen the conflict? Why did they react like that? 
Regarding the management behavior, students are expected to mention both the lack of 
dividend distribution or redemption policy, and the inadequate information and lack of inclusion 
of other branches in the company’s activities. In fact, continued lack of liquidity, which implies 
an altruistic expectation of return from owners, is hard to take for inactive members. They 
will only accept it if there is a trade-off for plenty opportunities to receive privileged information 
and education, in a mutual affection and influence relationship between active and inactive 
members, in order to engage with the family values of stewardship. (Poza 2007, 31)  
For their part, dissenters exacerbated the problem by reacting aggressively: 
instead of seeking enlightenment near the board, they went straight to public courts and 
organized undercover meetings and email chains between carefully selected shareholders. 
Responsible ownership in a cousin consortium requires one to contribute to cohesiveness 
of the family and seek education about the business on his own (Aronoff and Ward 2002, 
20), as well as “a public posture of loyalty and support, a willingness to think broadly 
about the common financial needs, and a willingness to contribute in some appropriate 
way one’s talent, effort and opinions.” (Gersick et al. 1997, 52).  
While both conducts were clearly inappropriate, no lesser were they expectable. 
In fact, family managers often consider that shareholders do not deserve to be involved 
in the decision making until they self-educate in financial and operational matters 
(Mcclure 2014), fearing the outcome of such uninformed democratic decisions (Poza 
2007, 41). Nevertheless, majority branches are still more open to dialogue than family 
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members with reduced power, who commonly interact with negative affect, through 
threats and punishment, and with more inhibited social behavior (Chandler 2015). The 
former see themselves as stewards seeking the common interest, whereas the latter deal 
with management through a principal-agent relationship (Madison et al. 2016). Therefore, 
minority owners, when made to feel impotent, can sue the company and take problems 
public as a way to still exercise their power (Aronoff and Ward 2002, 57).   
Finally, the keenest students may also identify that this Board is the first in later 
generations that does not include any member of the G branch, which escalates this 
branch’s feeling of being shut out of the decision process (Gersick et al. 1997, 52). 
1.4 – Taking the discussed conflict into consideration, how propitious seem the 
current circumstances to raise the discussion about the suggested changes? Why? 
The question is intended to focus on the need and urge to discuss the diversification 
investments and review of the governance structure - to which students should be able to find 
arguments in both ways - rather than to analyze their financial attractiveness, for which, for 
the sake of the case, the prospects of the management are taken as trustworthy in all questions. 
On one hand, these times may well be the last opportunity to fit the company’s 
legal and governance structures to its shareholder particularities, while they still know 
each other. Once the next generation steps in, the exponential dispersion of shares, which 
reflects in decreased engagement and poses a threat to continuity (Mcclure 2014), can 
make the gathering of an assembly quorum a virtually impossible aspiration, not to 
mention achieving agreement over structural questions. Moreover, the current conflict in 
the family can represent an opportunity to help it to properly differentiate between the 
two different systems on their bases - the family and the business ones – and thus generate 
more competitive advantage (García, Castejón, and Perez 2014). In fact, higher 
professionalization of family businesses often comes when family members recognize the 
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need of supplementary skills and governance techniques in moments of significant growth 
(Dyer 2010), as the proposed investments. Finally, the sustainability of the company seems 
to be at stake, and waiting for better conditions could make it lose the right timing to invest. 
On the other hand, one cannot ignore the serious downsides caused by the 
relationship between the supporters and dissenters, compounded by the court 
proceedings, and by the current economic conditions of the company. As seen in the case, 
conflict has already become personal, and this sort of relationship problems are highly 
detrimental to work groups, as they encourage withdrawal from the table even before the 
negotiating starts (Jehn 1995). Students familiar with the concept, can be able to identify 
the zero-sum dynamic in their relationship. This dynamic refers to relationships marked 
by a direct trade between one side’s perceived gain and the other’s perceived loss, 
common and critical when “those active in top management agree on a growth strategy, 
family members employed elsewhere believe that, in settling for greater reinvestment in 
the business, they will have to accept reduced distributions to shareholders” (Poza 2007, 
32). Worse still, zero-sum dynamics are exacerbated in the absence of growth: when the 
pie does not get any larger, members start fighting for the size of their slice. This makes 
members seek only their individual interests, blame others for downturns, and minimize 
personal risk instead of maximize business gains. Under these circumstances, even 
“promising alternatives for growth may be rejected as competition and in-fighting for 
resources – and for right or might – spread” (Poza 2007, 172), as verified in this case. 
2 – Current hindrances 
2.1 – The suggested project of diversification (wines and tourism) seems very 
promising, with considerably high financial estimates that portend the resurgence 
of dividends. In a common company, this “enlargement of the pie” should be enough 
to gather shareholders under the same flag again. Why is it not happening here? 
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Over the past decade, academia has been prolific in the study of family firms’ 
unique particularities that make them considerably less driven by the financial criteria 
followed by the remaining companies, which could not be explained by the traditional 
agency and resourced based view theories (Dawson and Mussolino 2014). Starting from 
the behavioral agency theory, by which decision makers follow a loss avoidance logic 
(Gottardo and Moisello 2015),  Gómez-Mejía et al (2007) were the first to introduce the 
concept of Socioemotional Wealth (commonly referred as SEW), referring to the sum of 
nonpecuniary benefits and affective endowments that family owners strive to derive from 
the business. Currently, this is scholarly accepted as the key point of difference between 
family companies and other types of businesses, since the former seem to be managed in 
order to preserve SEW, even at the expense of financial gains (Debicki et al. 2016), which 
is not to say these are fully ignored (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2011).  More specifically, this 
concept characterizes the family members’ desires for power of influence and decision, 
dynastic continuity, perpetuation of family values, pride of identity and legacy, social 
reputation and recognition for generosity, sense of belonging, and opportunities for 
altruism towards the family (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007; Pascual Berrone et al. 2010; 
Gómez-Mejía et al. 2011; P. Berrone, Cruz, and Gomez-Mejia 2012; Deephouse and 
Jaskiewicz 2013; Hauswald and Hack 2013; Mullins and Schoar 2013; Martin, Campbell, 
and Gómez-Mejía 2014; Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2014; Morgan and Gómez-Mejía 
2014; Vardaman and Gondo 2014; Gottardo and Moisello 2015; Debicki et al. 2016). 
2.2 – After reading the “The bind that ties”, which of the described patterns 
do you identify in this company? 
In order to consolidate the learning of the SEW concept and how it affects the present 
case, students should be requested a group assignment, which is explained below in the 
“Teaching Plan” section. All students should be advised to read the introduction and conclusion 
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sections of the referred paper, while regarding the remaining content, they can be split into 6 
different groups (to reduce workload, foster widespread participation, and facilitate assessment). 
The expected results are presented, according to the suggested division, in Appendix 6. 
2.3 – Even so, should we not expect to see the shareholders aligned in their 
interests, being them financial or socioemotional? 
No, actually the notion that families are naturally aligned in their interests is a 
misconception. Quite the opposite, heterogeneity and conflict of interests between 
branches are increasingly common with the rise in number of elements (Chandler 2015), 
making even some cousin consortiums function as multifamily firms (Steier, Chrisman, 
and Chua 2015). In this case, besides the conflicts, members seem to attribute different 
weights to the different components of socioemotional wealth. For instance, one can 
imagine how reputation in the wine production market rewards more the management 
than shareholders from other professional areas. In this sense, students may notice that 
the meetings organized by dissenters took place in another town because they live far 
away from the business, which is tendentially related with lower attachment to the real 
estate and the local status that the company owns (Gersick et al. 1997, 50). Furthermore, 
the CEO admits he cannot know nor understand the dissenters’ intentions, while also 
complaining they seem to have no clue and interest about the business. This mutual lack 
of understanding of each other’s feelings and intentions denounces an unhealthy culture 
where information does not flow properly, which may explain the absence of a common 
vision (Poza 2007, 27) regarding, for instance, the importance of continuity, dividends, 
growth, reputation, perks to the family, or altruism towards community. Indeed, the fear of 
losing value in patrimony (through seizure), benefits (usage of the residence) and power 
(possibility of equity issue) were some of the arguments used by dissenters to foster 
mistrust against the management, especially regarding the management’s new strategy. 
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2.4 – From all the observed influences of SEW that can be affecting 
shareholders differently, which one seems more preponderant in this situation? 
After having thoroughly followed their peers’ presentations, students should be able 
to identify the different attitudes towards risk as the main learning to consider to the solving 
of this case. As a matter of fact, the family seems to have a risk-averse behavior, patent in 
its business model stability, with no debt or new ventures. Congruently, the only large 
investment through debt referred in the case, the building of the two dams, was one of the 
events that prompted strife in the past. However, with the continuity of the firm under threat 
due to the declining performance, management and its supporters prefer to start a new 
venture instead of losing control of the iconic building owned since the very beginning of 
the company, even at the cost of increased risk (Fernando, Schneible, and Suh 2013). From 
their long-term perspective, they appreciate that, by holding two diversified businesses, the 
company can benefit from risk-reducing effects through fund transfers between them 
(Steier, Chrisman, and Chua 2015). On their hand, minority shareholders typically fear to 
see their value expropriated by majority blocks and therefore prefer to capture immediate 
liquidity, while the latter have greater benefits from seeking firm continuity and growth 
because they see it as an asset to leave to their descendants (Anderson and Reeb 2003).  
3 – Which resolution and reconciliation paths to the discussed problems could 
you advise to the management and/or shareholders group? 
1st – Provide education that enables participation 
As seen before, the family has been suffering the negative effects of the growing 
estrangement of some shareholders from the company and, since keeping shareholders 
informed and engaged with the business is a mutual responsibility, they should be invited 
to tackle these problems as a whole in family meetings (Poza 2007, 45). Nonetheless, in 
cases with such large families, it is more effective to carefully pick a smaller set of 
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influential elements who can positively represent and head the entire family than to aim to 
widespread democratic participation, which leads to the creation of family councils 
(Mcclure 2014). This governance body, equivalent in family to the board on the company, 
is an institutionalized form to periodically hold family meetings, and should be responsible 
to coordinate communication and education, enable conflict solving, and stimulate 
participation in policy-making (Poza 2007, 277). However, as the management claims, 
most shareholders do not have the knowledge required to effective decision making (e.g. 
never visited the premises and request for voting by head rather than by shares). Therefore, 
before they develop into planning and decision-making bodies, these meetings should start 
by being educational events about the state of the business, financial matters, the strategy 
followed, and the challenges it faces, as well as the rights and duties of a shareholder (Poza 
2007, 39, 41). Education about the business and its forms of governance is critical to prevent 
abdication of control, because it helps to understand the risks of inaction (softening resistance 
to change), provides a common language and framing of its problems (enhancing the quality 
of contributions), and offers several new mind-opening possibilities to the business 
(renewing hope and stimulating excitement and commitment) (Lansberg and Gersick 2015).  
2nd – Allow for participation that prevents future conflict 
Fighting the zero-sum environment is the most common reason that makes business 
families hold meetings and create a council (Poza 2007, 39) but these, by themselves, have 
no proof of positive influence in family conflicts if not accompanied by a family protocol 
(García, Castejón, and Perez 2014). A family protocol or constitution is a formal but non-
legal “document that summarizes the family’s mission, its fundamental values, the 
functions and responsibilities of each governance body (e.g., Board, Family Council, Family 
Office) and each policy (e.g., employment, conflict of interest, dividend, retirement) that the 
family owners have adopted to regulate their relationships with each other, their business, 
their philanthropy, and their collectively owned assets.”(Lansberg and Gersick 2015). 
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Both the vision, that sets what the family wants its company for, and the policies, that 
aim to address typical issues beforehand, ought to represent the whole family preferences and 
so must be the result of a widespread participation rather than decisions enforced by the 
family council or, even worst, by the board (Eckrich and Mcclure 2013). The concept of 
fairness in family business is perceived through different criteria (equality, equity/merit, or 
needs) used to distribute the outcomes (distributive justice) according to the perspective of 
each sub-system (ownership, business, family, respectively) (Baldridge and Schulze 1999). 
Due to the blurred boundaries between these sub-systems, and even though it takes longer, it 
is essential to place the effort on an inclusive process that gives voice to everyone - procedural 
justice - instead, because it allows members to understand and accept decisions even when 
these do not favor them, and eliminates the apparent negative tradeoff between emotional and 
economic performance (Fair Process: Van der Heyden, Blondel, and Carlock 2005). 
 As a matter of fact, due to the entrenched distrust between both sides, the family 
should consider resorting to an outside advisor to mediate this discussion and help the launching 
of the family council, bringing to family members a perception of fairness and objectivity 
in the process (Poza 2007, 276), because mediators commit to the process rather than to an 
option, and prevent discussions from becoming personal (Russo and Schoemaker 2002, 181). 
At this point, students should recall important matters to be discussed, as the 
(false) inequitable distribution of shares in the second generation or the possibility of 
inclusion of an element from branch G in the Board. Likewise, other forms of shareholder 
engagement could also be suggested. When the management foments them to visit the 
premises, interact with employees and stakeholders, and participate in auxiliary 
governance activities, it helps both the relationship (increasing trust, comprehension of 
sacrifices needed, and sense of responsibility to contribute) and the firm’s performance 
(through informed decisions and value-added contributions) (Mcclure 2014). 
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3rd – Hard measures 
Sometimes, conflict escalates to a point where achieving consensus could take so 
long that the discussion would backfire (Russo and Schoemaker 2002, 182), making the 
buyout of the outsiders becomes more realistic than to aspire to reach cohesiveness again 
(Aronoff and Ward 2002, 54). Even though the firms does not have enough liquidity to 
redeem them, keeping disagreeing cousins captive can prove far more costly in terms of 
time, emotional stress, and legal fees (Gersick et al. 1997, 53). The solution may be the 
creation of redemption mechanisms, based on specialized external evaluation of 
shareholdings to increase trustfulness, with policies that specify the circumstances under 
which transactions can occur (e.g., frequency, percentage of profits set aside to 
redemption pool, use of internal broker) to minimize unfairness and negative effects on 
the company (Aronoff and Ward 2002, 49; Mcclure 2014, 53). Actually, even when not 
exercised, the simple ability to sell their stock is often enough to appease dissatisfied 
owners, who tend to recommit to ownership with renewed enthusiasm (Poza 2007, 60). 
What Happened 
The case has not yet been solved. The Board ended up deciding to hire a family 
business consultant to mediate the wording of a family constitution and the creation of a 
family council. Despite his efforts, consensus was not achieved and, therefore, only 66% of 
the shares committed to the outcomes. Branch G and part of branch F made a parallel 
commitment (30% of shares) to block any changes in bylaws and chose three members to 
represent them near the Board, whilst the remaining 4% belong to other passive owners who 
chose to ignore this process. The current family council has six elected members, only one 
from branch I, and is considering to invite the above referred representatives to occupy the 
three vacant seats. According to the consultant, the three main claims from dissenters were: 
displeasure with the lack of information from the management, fear of losing wealth through 
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indebtedness, and refuse to forego their blocking power with 25%. In 2015, the firm returned 
to (a small) profit thanks to wine sales, which continued to grow above expectations (+25%).  
Teaching Plan 
 This case was divided in three parts (45 min) to be discussed in separate classes, in 
order to allow the instructor to use the remaining class time to deepen the theoretical 
concepts introduced by it. Alternatively, the last two parts can be discussed within the same 
lesson. At the end of the first part, students should be split into 6 groups and be assigned a 
section (according to the division patent in the Appendix 6) of the article “The Bind That 
Ties” by Gómez-Mejía et al. Each group should then summarize their corresponding 
content and how it reflects on the case, and present it to their colleagues in no more than 
4/5 minutes at the beginning of class two. The suggested time planning is presented below: 
 
 
Background Reading  
The following list can be used both by the instructor and his pupils to prepare or 
deepen the contents taught in this case: 
 Poza 2007 – Comprehensive support book, covering all topics except SEW. 
 Question 1: Gersick et al. 1997 – The development model of family business, with 
the three sub-systems’ and ownership stages’ particularities  
 Question 2: Gómez-Mejía et al. 2011 – Thorough collection of academic studies 
about SEW’s effects on family businesses’ decisions (shall be given to students)  
 Question 3: Aronoff and Ward 2002 – Ownership rights, duties, and conflict solving 
+ Van der Heyden, Blondel, and Carlock 2005 – Deepens the concept of Fair Process. 
Part When What Duration 
1 Class 1 
Case introduction by instructor and/or volunteers 5 min 
45min Discussion of questions 1 30 min 
Question 2.1 and launch of group assignment 10 min 
Homework Suggested assignment 2 hours 
2 Class 2 
Group presentations – question 2.2 6x5=30min 
45min 
Discussion of results with questions 2.3 and 2.4 15 min 
3 Class 2 or 3 
Discussion of question 3 30 
45min 
Instructor wrap-up and “what actually happened” 15 
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APPENDIX TO THE TEACHING NOTE 
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Appendix 6 – Expected Results from Student’s Assignment 
Typical SEW patterns described in the paper Application to the case 
Management Processes 
Succession: Desire to transfer business control to next 
generation. Favor a successor from within the family. Prepare 
successor through personal mentoring with leader. 
The successor, current leader’s son, is already chosen and being 
prepared through co-working with the latter. In this case, the 
CEO’s “reluctance to plan for his succession” does not apply. 
Professionalization: Lower to avoid decrease family control, 
but also due to smaller size and fewer resources.  
CEO’s claims the firm does not have resources to hire more 
people and that an outsider successor is out of question. Still, the 
number of non-family qualified workers has been increasing and 
the proposed strategy contemplates hiring of outside talent, even 
for the board. 
Human resource management practices: Informal systems 
of communication with employees. Selection based on 
candidates who share family values. 
Indiscriminate monetary compensation. Close and loyal 
relationship with employees. 
 
Strategic Choices (from Risk Taking to International Diversification) 
Risk Taking, Corporate and International diversification: 
Risk-averse under normal conditions, but risk-willing to 
prevent losses to accumulated endowment, namely when 
performance is below target, in order to retain family control. 
Therefore, they diversify less (because it requires external 
funding, talent from outside the family and changes in the 
organization) unless there is a strong fear-factor due to high 
systematic and unsystematic risk and declining performance. 
Also, they tend to be less internationalized, even though it 
reduces systematic and unsystematic risk, because it demands 
external funding and expertise. 
Historically, only during economic downturns did the family seek 
diversification strategies with increased risk: fruit sale (new 
business), and wine and tourism business (which demand both 
debt, outside talent, and a whole new form of governance and firm 
structure). 
Dams were only built under extremely favorable conditions, with 
governmental support through debt. 
The company seek internationalization in recent years, to grow 
the wine business, but it was also done with communitarian funds 
and by developing in-house expertise. 
 
Debt: is avoided, at least when its acquisition may exacerbate 
the possibility of family conflict. 
Investments that entail debt (dams and hotel) were highly 
contested, and firm tends to have zero debt. 
Strategic Choices (from Acquisition behavior to R&D) 
Acquisition behavior, Accounting choices, R&D These are not reflected by data presented in the case. 
Organizational Governance 
Role of the Board, Incentive alignment, and Agency 
Contract 
These are not reflected by data presented in the case, but students 
may note that never was a CEO dismissed by the family. 
Stakeholder Relationships 
Concerned about family reputation and thus more responsive 
to claims and sanctions that stigmatize them as an 
irresponsible corporate citizen. Tend to create and protect 
long-term relationships. 
The court case and its public repercussions were the trigger to 
contestation in the present generation. 
The company opts for long-lasting commercial partnerships with 
small retailers and distributors for the wine and olive oil 
businesses. 
CSR: More environmentally friendly and socially responsible 
behaviors, mostly when socially and geographically 
embedded at the local level. 
The family has a long historic record of social altruism, mostly in 
the farm region, and is particularly environmentally conscious 
(organic and biodynamic production) 
Business Venturing and Contingency Variables 
New ventures and entrepreneurship: as the business 
matures, families are more likely to build portfolios of related 
businesses, meaning that new ventures are restricted to core-
related activities. 
The hotel project is the first completely new venture considered 
by the family. Yet, the development strategy of the restaurant, 
fruit, and wine businesses can also be analyzed under this trend. 
Contingency Variables: While firm moves through 
generations, sew weight lessens and financial considerations 
start become more important. This happens with the 
dispersion of shares, when family unity is weakened. Also, 
families are more willing to make economically driven 
decisions under performance and external hazards. 
These contingency variables have different effects in both sides 
of the discussion, which illustrates the loss of family unity: 
Some shareholders request for dividends and want to sell the 
urban estate, because they are less influenced by SEW than 
others. Same thing that happened after the revolution. 
Management and its supporters, as already seen before, have 
more tolerance to risk, diversification, and debt when hazard 
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